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other individuals, but Mr. Hobhouse means much more than this. In speaking of the system based on the greatest happiness principle and that alone, he says: "It failed to satisfy the deep-seated conviction that man,—not only the individual, but the race,—has a function to perform, a part to play in things, that even if the race as a whole could be happy without performing this function, something essential would be missed." Again, it is clear that he conceives an ultimate state where the claims of society and of the individual are reconciled in a way far surpassing anything now. As it is, man and society are often at variance, and it is not always man who is to blame. "For in the instincts, the needs, the impulses of the personality are implicit all the strands that connect the individual with the whole life of mind, whereas in the actual fabric of society wherein he is called to play his part, the requirements of the spiritual order may be very imperfectly met. . . . The problem is so to conceive the claims of personality as to make them not disruptive of the social order but working constituents of social harmony."

True, it is a problem, and a mighty one. Mr. Hobhouse sees that in the working out of it intuitively, much depends on whether we conceive mankind as moving forward to master possibilities or not. The value we attach to liberty depends on that: those of us who worship liberty do so in the belief that through error, so it be active, man attains to truth, because in all the operations of mind truth is working. But if we are wise, we know how long the process is and how heavy the price. To make us pay the price, we must believe that "the amplitude of time" will bring the purchase. "If it were merely a question of realizing immediate good as it appears to us, coercion would be always in place. Liberty has its value only in a far longer game" (p. 196). Mr. Hobhouse does not in the most distant way touch on the question of immortality; but it may be asked in this connection if it can ultimately be avoided.

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F. MELIAN STAWELL.

ETHICS. By the Rev. Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D.
London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. (The People's Books Series.) Pp. iii, 96.

The publishers of 'The People's Books' are to be congratulated on having secured the services of Canon Rashdall to write the

volume on ethics in their series; his "The Theory of Good and Evil" (1907) is one of the two or three best recent books on the subject, and the present volume, which is practically a condensation of that work, exhibits all the merits which we are accustomed to expect from his writing,—acuteness in argument, sobriety of statement, freedom from dogmatism on the one hand and from washy enthusiasm on the other. It repeats in small compass and popular form the well-known features of his ethical position. These are, briefly, the utilitarian definition of the rightness of acts as depending on their consequences, combined with denial of the traditional utilitarian view that the value of consequences depends on the amount of pleasure and pain they contain, and, finally, insistence on the objectivity of moral judgments.

I am inclined to think that Canon Rashdall is right on all these three points; my own criticism is that he does not seem clearly to have distinguished from one another the various difficulties that must be faced before they can be regarded as established. For instance, where several alternative courses of action are open, which is it one's duty to select,—that which will actually produce the best total results, or that which there is reason to think will produce them? No light is thrown on this difficult question. Again, he holds that the fact of an action's being the one which will (or probably will) produce the best results is a mark by which it can always be recognized as right; and he would say, I think, though he does not make this clear, that this is not merely *a* mark of rightness, but is *the only* mark. Yet there might be more than one characteristic belonging to all right actions and to no others: the intuitionist who believes that the presence of a specific moral emotion is an infallible guarantee of the rightness of an action might say that every action accompanied by this emotion was also one which produced the best results. Another question of which the treatment does not seem quite satisfactory is that as to the nature of the ends of moral action. While rightly rejecting hedonism, Canon Rashdall does not grapple with the different problems raised by the fact that all things that have intrinsic value are complex and always (or almost always) contain pleasure.

There is a certain weakness, finally, in his discussion of the objectivity of moral judgments, which comes from his failure to

notice that, as Mr. G. E. Moore has pointed out,* the 'objectivity' and 'rationality' of moral judgments imply that they are true at all times and under all circumstances. When we say that 'this is good' or 'this act is right' are 'objective' truths, we do not merely mean to deny that what these propositions are concerned with is the feelings or thoughts of a particular man or men at a particular time; we mean also to assert that, if they are true, then the thing in question would always be equally good, and any act which produced exactly the same results would be right whenever it occurred. Were Canon Rashdall to develop his view of the rationality of moral judgments along these lines, he might perhaps reconsider much that he says about the connection between morality and religion in his last chapter. Though he refrains from basing morality on religion, he does not believe that for an atheist "our moral judgments can carry with them the same kind of objectivity that they do for the theist," arguing that, unless we can suppose them to be in some way the expression of a divine mind, moral laws will not be on the same level of objectivity with physical laws. But when it is seen that moral judgments, when true, are true in the universal kind of way just indicated, there is no reason for denying to them as much objectivity as belongs to the propositions of physics or mathematics.

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SYDNEY WATERLOW.

AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS. By Henri Bergson. Authorized translation by T. E. Hulme. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. vi, 79.

Mr. Hulme is to be congratulated on his excellent translation of Bergson's sketch of metaphysics which appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January, 1903. He has done a service to many readers in England and America, for in Bergson's larger works the fundamental ideas of his philosophy are complicated by so much detail that they are often difficult to grasp. The present essay, stating them as it does simply and clearly, saves the student a good deal of unnecessary trouble.

* In his review of Dr. Rashdall's "The Theory of Good and Evil" in *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1908, and in his "Ethics" (Williams & Norgate, 1912).